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Abstract— Intrusion Detection Systems are an accepted and very 
useful option to monitor, and detect malicious activities. 
However, Intrusion Detection Systems have inherent limitations 
which lead to false positives and false negatives; we propose that 
combining signature and anomaly based IDSs should be 
examined. This paper contrasts signature and anomaly-based 
IDSs, and critiques some proposals about hybrid IDSs with 
signature and heuristic capabilities, before considering some of 
their contributions in order to include them as main features of a 
new hybrid IDS named CONDOR (COmbined Network intrusion 
Detection ORientate), which is designed to offer superior pattern 
analysis and anomaly detection by reducing false positive rates 
and administrator intervention.  
Keywords – Anomaly, signature, hybrid, IDS, NIDS, false positive, 
false negative, intrusion detection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) monitor, and detect 
malicious activities against a computer or a set of computers. 
With the advance of cloud computing and evidence that 
traditional host based protection is not a pancea to security they 
are becoming a necessity [1].  However, they have some 
limitations which may lead to false positives and false 
negatives [2]. For instance, if a new service or application is 
installed, a heuristic-based IDS may define this behaviour as a 
false positive whereas if malicious code has been slightly 
modified, it can bypass the signature-based IDS detection as a 
false negative [3]. Therefore, detecting false 
positives/negatives is a hard task which, if unsuccessful, can 
compromise the entire network security. 
This research explores a new mechanism to reduce false 
positives and negatives during attack detection. In doing so we 
have reviewed previous work to explore and analyze ways in 
which signature and anomaly-based IDSs can be combined to 
offer more efficient detection capabilities. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, 
the deficiencies of both anomaly and signature-based detection 
methods are compared and discussed. In Section 3, four 
proposed models of IDSs with signature, heuristic, and hybrid 
capabilities are analysed along with their contributions so that a 
new hybrid IDS model, named as CONDOR, can be deployed 
to offer better detection against known and unknown attacks. 
In Section 4, CONDOR is discussed to explain how it can 
reduce false positive/negative rates, and enhance the overall 
IDS performance without excessive administrator intervention. 
Finally, conclusions and constraints in our proposal are 
offered for further research. 
II. CONTRAST BETWEEN SIGNATURE AND ANOMALY 
BASED IDSS 
A. Deficiencies of Signature-Based IDSs 
A signature/misuse/pattern-based IDS scans packets 
looking for a set of patterns that may constitute an attack in 
progress. In addition, this kind of IDS conducts a deep 
inspection of the packet sections looking for malicious patterns 
in the content of the header and payload. Even though this 
inspection method seems effective, there are two main 
disadvantages of these IDSs, namely inaccuracy of the 
signature detection against unknown attacks [4], and 
deficiencies in pattern analysis [5]. 
The first disadvantage is due to misuse-based IDSs being 
unable to detect unknown attacks, or variations of a previous 
attack pattern [6]. This is due to signature based IDSs rely on 
string comparison [7]; thus variants of the attack as well as 
unknown attacks can deviate from the comparison string, or 
signature,  and avoid detection, leading to false negatives [8]. 
Secondly, misuse-based IDSs have deficiencies regarding 
pattern analysis, and rule writing techniques [3]. Writing rules 
using a root-cause analysis of the intrusion is reliable as it 
considers the context of the attack, and not only its 
characteristics [9]. However, it relies on the human ability to 
make a good analysis of the vulnerability, so if all the possible 
causes are not properly analyzed, the rule becomes ineffective. 
Additionally, the root-cause analysis is a time-consuming 
process that can take days, or even months to produce results 
[3]. Conversely, writing unique-pattern rules is both quick, and 
simple because it involves looking for data that is unique for 
either an exploit, or any other malicious traffic, without a deep 
understanding of how the vulnerability actually works [10]. 
Due to the outlined issues, writing rules by either analyzing 
their root causes, or simply crafting them for a specific 
malicious attack, often involves participation of security 
analyst communities [11]. These communities work together to 
2 
look through reported attacks, e.g. Snort blog1; however, the 
nature of these attacks may be just isolated events instead of 
being a general security issue. 
B. Deficiencies of Anomaly-Based IDSs 
In case of anomaly/heuristic-based IDSs, some 
disadvantages are present in the behavioural model generated 
during the training phase [12], in the system performance [4], 
and in the administrator intervention [13]; the last two during 
the detection phase. 
Initially, anomaly-based IDSs create a heuristic model to 
compare the current network activity with normal 
characteristics of traffic [3]. Then, if the current traffic deviates 
from the normal behaviour, the administrator is alerted to a 
possible attack in progress [14]. Although, this IDS is shown to 
be more effective at detecting unknown attacks [15], a lot of 
time must be invested during the training phase in order to 
create a database with normal operation thresholds to reduce 
the false alarm rate [12]. Moreover, some anomaly-based IDSs 
base their training time considering only one computer, which 
does not represent a real network operation where different 
computers and environments coexist [8]. The detection task is 
inaccurate as a result of false positives due to the lack of 
behavioural information generated in the comparison model.  
In contrast, regarding system performance, much recent 
research has focused on system call anomaly detection, the 
analysis of which relies on techniques such as neural networks, 
and data mining [6]. Particularly, two prominent lines of 
knowledge in the field of anomaly based IDSs have been 
identified. These are mathematical [16], or neural network 
assisted [17]. Both of these, however, have shown limitations 
in performance due to high resource utilisation. For instance, 
the first implements statistical models and data mining to 
define normal behaviour [18] [19] which is highly resource 
intensive due to both time and processing requirements 
necessary for defining threshold levels and the analysis of what 
constitutes deviation.  The second employs neural networks 
with the purpose of reducing false positives; however, its 
processing time is even longer [4] due to the recursive routines 
in neural networks 2 . Hence, even though both lines of 
knowledge are focused on reducing the false positive rate, both 
compromise the overall system performance as well; in 
particular, when neural networks are employed. 
Finally, during the detection phase, some anomaly-based 
IDSs send alert messages asking for administrator intervention 
[13]. At this point, the IDS may warn of potential intrusions 
even when they are related to false positives. This is often due 
to a lack of information of normal behaviour where the IDS 
cannot differentiate legitimate operations from attacks [8]; e.g. 
if a new application is deployed, or an existing one is upgraded, 
the IDS may raise an alert if the event is defined as abnormal.  
C. Comparison Between Signature and Anomal- Based IDSs 
Given the deficiencies outlined above, we now proceed to 
exploring the key differences and contrasts between anomaly 
and signature-based IDSs. 
                                                            
1 Snort blog is available at http://blog.snort.org/ 
2 This is the recursion required during the training phase cited 
in Yong, 2010, p.405 
• Pattern IDSs search for known attack signatures whilst 
anomaly IDSs look for deviations in normal operation 
behaviour to detect unknown attacks [20]. Then, if an 
attack is undetectable using signatures, it may be identified 
by anomaly-based IDSs [3]. Furthermore, since anomaly 
based IDSs build behavioural models for the detection of 
unknown attacks [12], they are not dependant on signature 
coding, or string matching criteria; therefore, the 
understandability, learnability and operability in an 
anomaly-based IDS may be higher than the correspondent 
characteristics of usability 3  in a signature based IDS 
because the former learns from the user behaviour, and the 
second requires a constant input of new signatures. 
• Anomaly-based IDSs require a training stage to define 
normal behaviour thresholds; however, even though a 
signature-based IDS does not require training, it is more 
likely to report false negatives when an attack does not 
match a rule, e.g. when the attacker changes the malicious 
patterns of the attack to deviate from a preconfigured 
signature [21]. Correspondingly, when considering 
dynamic network activity, it is more likely to have false 
positives than that of anomaly-based IDSs [4] [22].  
• Both IDSs are focused on detecting attacks in the network 
layer; however, at present, the tendency of attackers is to 
compromise systems at the application layer [20]. Thus, 
due to the unknown events that may occur at this layer via 
the differing nature of applications, it seems that anomaly-
based detection could be more appropriate, although they 
may fail in the purpose of detecting specific forms of 
known attacks like SQL injections, where signature-based 
IDSs are shown to be more effective [20]. 
III. COMBINING SIGNATURE AND ANOMALY-BASED IDSS 
FOR SUPERIOR DETECTION 
As discussed in the previous section, since signature and 
anomaly-based IDSs may have some inherent deficiencies, 
combining them could be an important solution in order to 
harden the intrusion detection process [23]. This has been fairly 
discussed in previous models about hybrid IDSs, the features of 
which are analyzed in this section with a view to combining 
them into a hybrid IDS capable of detecting both known and 
unknown attacks, taking advantage of the signature accuracy, 
and the heuristic versatility.  
In the work done by Hwang et al. [24], a hybrid IDS with 
heuristic capabilities, and automatic signature generation is 
proposed. First, Snort is connected in cascade with a novel 
Anomaly Detection System (ADS), in order to detect possible 
attacks. This proposal followed a serial production line to 
detect intrusions, generate rules, and update the Snort database. 
As first step, the standalone Snort installation detects known 
attacks using its raw signature database. Then, an episode-
mining engine generates frequent episode rules (FERs) with 
different levels of support thresholds to enable unknown attack 
detection. It is an enhanced process to define anomalous 
                                                            
3  The term and definition of usability is proposed in the 
ISO/IEC 9126 standard for every software-based product 
whose characteristics are the understandability, learnability, 
operability, among others.   
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episodes in which the FERs are evaluated with pre-computed 
frequent episodes from normal traffic. Hence, the FERs which 
thresholds levels either mismatch the frequency levels of these 
normal episodes, or match them with unusual high frequency 
are considered as anomalous. Subsequently, the anomalous 
FERs are used to generate signatures, and update the Snort 
database for further detection. Therefore, in terms of precision, 
this proposal seems to offer a proper intrusion detection 
solution with less administrator intervention; nonetheless the 
malicious sequences or episodes analyzed with the Snort 
database are based on standard pattern comparisons which omit 
the fact that this signature-based IDS may not detect attacks in 
different sections of the sequences. Moreover, this model 
updates the signature database simultaneously every time an 
anomaly is detected; as consequence, the processing time, and 
the whole system overhead may be high. 
The work done by Zhang et al. [20] was also analyzed, in 
which a novel signature-based IDS for detecting database 
intrusion was suggested in order to enhance SQL injection 
detection. In this model, instead of directly using a signature-
based IDS to detect intrusions, a sniffer is implemented to 
capture database communication packets received by the n 
database hosts in order to extract SQL commands. Later, these 
sequences are sent to a database signature-based detection 
system to match them with known attack patterns. Hence, the 
sniffer reduces the throughput in the database signature-based 
IDS by just sending the sequences with suspicious content. 
However, the disadvantage with this model is that it only 
detects database intrusions, so it cannot be used as a general 
signature-based IDS for monitoring an entire network with 
different services and behaviour.  
In order to improve heuristic, and signature detection, a 
hybrid IDS proposed by Li et al. is analyzed [6]. First, this 
model captures system call sequences based on pattern 
matching by inspecting the names, parameters and returned 
values on each system call. Next, the captured sequences are 
sent to a sequence analysis and matching module in which they 
are divided in short sequences of k length using the sliding 
window algorithm. This step is performed to detect unknown 
patterns in the sequences that could not be detected by normal 
signature matching. Later, these sequences are used to create a 
heuristic model by defining short sequence correlation and 
matching coefficients. Finally, the sequence patterns defined as 
normal are used to generate a database of secure sequence 
patterns. As a result, the intrusion detection relies on both 
signature and anomaly detection systems, but unlike the prior 
hybrid IDS discussed, this one improves the intrusion detection 
by defining anomalous episodes based on mathematical models 
(correlation and matching models) instead of in just their 
frequency (frequent episode rules). Nonetheless, this model 
was tested on just one computer with its efficacy in a realistic 
network environment undetermined. 
An improvement on this aspect is considered by Ohtahara 
et al. [12] with a distributed anomaly-based IDS named 
ADCOIN. It is a client/server-oriented IDS which creates 
normal behaviour threshold levels during its training phase by 
considering different environments on the network. One 
integrated database is created which is replicated on each of the 
hosts for local anomaly analysis. ADCOIN combines host and 
network intrusion detection into one model. Even though this 
approach increases the human interaction, it reduces the false 
alarm rate because the heuristic model is built considering 
similar behaviour in the entire network environment and not in 
just one machine. 
In conclusion, although the discussed models have some 
disadvantages, they have shown interesting approaches that 
may be implemented into an improved hybrid IDS. In the 
following section, CONDOR which combines many of the 
positive aspects of the above systems, while mitigating many 
of the disadvantages, is proposed. 
IV. INTRODUCING CONDOR: AN IMPROVED HYBRID IDS 
CONDOR (COmbined Network intrusion Detection 
ORientate) is focused on improving the performance of a 
hybrid IDS, reducing false positive rates, and administrator 
intervention as much as possible. Furthermore, CONDOR 
incorporates the main features of the models discussed in 
Section 3, into a new architectural model for distributed 
anomaly detection and automated signature generation. In 
essence, CONDOR balances the sequence capture using a 
sniffer, and a similar architecture suggested by Zhang et al. 
[20]. A distributed anomaly-based IDS approach is also used 
similar to that proposed by Ohtahara et al. [12], the sliding 
window algorithm used is the one suggested by Li et al. [6] to  
 
Figure 1.  Proposed Structure of CONDOR  combining a Signature Based 
IDS and a Distributed Anomaly Based IDS with Signature Generation and 
Anomaly Detection Capabilities 
 
get the sequence patterns. Finally, the former approach 
suggested by Hwang et al. [24] is also considered in order to 
generate new signatures from the collected sequences, and 
therefore, reduce the administrator intervention. Thus, 
CONDOR’s three core modules are: the user interface, the 
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signature detection component (S), and the anomaly detection 
component (A); the model structure is shown in Fig.1. The User 
Interface 
As a main point of communication in CONDOR, the user 
interface is in charge of coordinating the communication 
between the administrator, the signature detection component, 
and the anomaly detection component. The alert messages are 
displayed on CONDOR’s console where the administrator can 
also configure both components. 
A. The Signature Detection Component 
In CONDOR, this component is formed by a pattern 
analyzer and a signature database. 
This pattern analyzer is essentially a sniffer which captures 
and processes the system call sequences that it can identify in 
the packets received and sent by n hosts, each of which 
provides n applications/services. This structure is like the one 
proposed by Guo-Song and Zhi-Chao [22], in which a group of 
detectors monitor all the traffic from and to the n hosts. Then, 
as suggested by Zhang et al. [20], this analyzer compares the 
sequences according to the patterns stored in the signature 
database. Subsequently, if an attack is detected, the analyzer 
sends an alert message to the user interface, and a kill message 
is sent to the host in order to terminate the process detected as 
malicious. The risk of having a false positive here is low 
because the process is killed only if the sequence matches a 
malicious signature. It is expected then, that the false positive 
rate in the entire network will be reduced.  
If an attack is not detected, the pattern analyzer sends the 
sequence back to the host in which the anomalous sequence 
was originated. Afterwards, assuming the sequence as a false 
negative, it is analyzed by the anomaly detection component in 
order to define whether it is a normal behaviour or not.  
B. The Anomaly Detection Component 
CONDOR’s anomaly detection component performs 
heuristic analysis on the sequences assumed as false negatives. 
As previously highlighted by Ohtahara et al. [12], it comprises 
of one integrated anomaly database stored in an anomaly-
based server, and a set of local anomaly databases stored in 
the n hosts or anomaly-based clients. The purpose of having 
an integrated anomaly database is to collect anomalous 
behaviour from the different local anomaly-based clients so 
that a very accurate behavioural model can be created 
considering the entire network. Hence, CONDOR’s employs  
both the server and the clients to form one single anomaly-
based IDS, as shown in Fig.1. Three engines exist within this 
structure to assist the heuristic detection, they are: the local 
anomaly analyzer, the anomaly database integration engine, 
and the signature generation engine. 
 
1) Local Anomaly Analyzer. 
In order to perform the local anomaly analysis, each 
CONDOR client retrieves the integrated anomaly database 
from the server. The client waits for a sequence to arrive; then, 
each sequence is analyzed against the replicated database. The 
client in charge of analyzing a given sequence is the one that 
receives it from the pattern analyzer. If the sequence is not a 
subset of the replicated database, a message is sent to 
CONDOR’s user interface asking for administrator 
intervention. The administrator has to decide whether the new 
sequence is anomalous or normal. If the sequence is defined as 
normal, it is added to the replicated database which now 
becomes different from the integrated database, given that a 
new sequence has been added, and thus, becoming a local 
database which is active only in the current client’s 
environment. As the sequence was defined as normal, the 
process continues its normal operation. If the sequence is not 
normal, the client kills the process.  
The problem with this form of anomaly detection, (as 
previously suggested by Gui-Xiang and Wei-Min [12]), is the 
possibility of having false positives due to the client 
performing a very subtle sequence analysis. In CONDOR, the 
analysis of anomalous sequences is enhanced by using the 
sliding window algorithm, as suggested by Li et al. [6]. In this 
algorithm, the sequence is divided in short sequences of k 
length. For explanation purposes, it is assumed that each one 
of the short sequences is a subset of the entire sequence, as 
shown in (1): 




• S is the original sequence comprising of Si subsets 
• n is the number of subsets in which the original S 
sequence was divided, using the sliding window 
algorithm. 
 
It is assumed that these subsets are exclusive. 
 
Each one of the subsets is compared against the replicated 
database in the client, and its matching percentage is the short 
sequence matching result [6]. 
 
Later, each short sequence is compared with the normal 
thresholds in the replicated database. The probability of 
having them on this database is the mathematical expectation 
E, the maximum of which is the correlation coefficient, as 
shown in (2). 
  max  (𝐸(𝑆!)!!!! )               (2) 
 
Therefore, as stated by Li et al. [6], if the short sequence 
matching result is >= 80%, the sequence is normal. If the short 
sequences matching result is >=60% and the correlation 
coefficient is >=60%, the sequence is normal. Otherwise, the 
sequence is considered as abnormal in which case: the process 
is killed, the sequence is sent to the CONDOR’s signature 
generation engine, and the alarm is sent to the user interface 
to notify the administrator. In all the cases where the sequence 
is normal, it is registered on the replicated database which 
becomes the local database because it is different from the 
former integrated database. In CONDOR, this method of 
sequence analysis reduces the false negative rate because the 
matching spectrum is considered using short sequences rather 
than the original sequence sent by the pattern analyzer. I.e. the 
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sequence is added to the local anomaly database only if both 
the matching result and correlation coefficient defined it as 
normal. 
  
2) Anomaly Database Integration Engine. 
Once the sequences have been analyzed, the result is a local 
database with a set of new sequences. In order to merge these 
events in CONDOR’s integrated anomaly database, the 
majority algorithm suggested by Gui-Xiang and Wei-Min [12] 
is used. 
First, all the collected sequences on each anomaly-based 
client represent various normal events, which may be normal 
in the other clients as well. Then, CONDOR’s anomaly-based 
server retrieves each local database, and defines how many 
clients have reported the same sequences. Next, the number of 
clients is assigned as a sentinel value to each set of sequences. 
Once all the databases have been assessed, if the sentinel value 
of a given sequence is much smaller than the others, the server 
judges it as anomalous, and the sequence is added to 
CONDOR’s integrated database.   
Thus, next time a client needs to perform an analysis, it will 
retrieve the last version of the integrated database, and at the 
same time, each client will contribute to detect anomalies, 
defining normal behaviour thresholds locally which will be 
included later as a general network behaviour model. 
 
3) Signature Generation Engine. 
In order to tackle the excessive administrator intervention 
due to the alert messages in CONDOR’s console, the signature 
database has to be updated.  The current model follows the 
same proposal suggested by Hwang et al. [24], modified in 
such way that CONDOR’s signature generation engine is part 
of the integrated anomaly server instead of being an isolated 
component. This is done with the purpose of avoiding the 
heuristic detection and signature generation in parallel. I.e., 
CONDOR’s anomaly-based server uses the signature 
generation engine only if it receives abnormal system call 
sequences from any of the anomaly-based clients. Therefore, 
new signatures are generated by this engine to update 
CONDORS’s signature database, once the abnormal sequences 
have gone through the whole anomaly detection process as a 
result of a false negative which bypassed the signature 
detection. Thus, next time a similar sequence is sent to the 
signature-based component, it will be detected immediately 
reducing both the processing time of sequences in the anomaly-
based component, and the administration intervention attending 
alert messages in the console due to false positives.   
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Signature and anomaly based IDSs are security devices 
that must be deployed to harden the security in a network 
infrastructure. Moreover, as previously discussed, 
combining these IDSs is important in order to enhance the 
detection of unknown attacks  and pattern analysis in 
misuse-based IDSs, as well as mitigating the disadvantages 
in the behavioural model generation, system performance, 
and high administrator intervention in anomaly-based IDSs. 
As consequence, improved protection against attacks can be 
achieved, maximising the chances of intrusion detection 
through signature-based capabilities to detect known attacks, 
and the anomaly-based IDS’s ability to detect suspicious 
behaviour using heuristics. By this means, malicious packet 
sequences that may have bypassed the signature control can 
be detected. 
In our proposal of hybrid IDS, CONDOR’s design (Fig. 1) 
proposes a new architectural model for distributed anomaly 
detection and automated signature generation, incorporating 
the main features of the models discussed in Section 3. In fact, 
CONDOR reduces the user intervention to update signatures 
and thresholds; the first in misuse-based IDSs, and the second 
in heuristic-based IDSs during training phase. Additionally, the 
enhancements on the short sequence definition in the model 
suggested by Ohtahara et al. [12] enables CONDOR to generate 
a more accurate behavioural model. However, as the short 
sequence analysis is still relying on string matching 
comparison, there may still be a chance to have a false negative 
which may have been apparent over the larger sequence. 
Finally, one advantage of using the distributed anomaly-
based IDS, proposed by Ohtahara et al. [12], inside the 
CONDOR’s anomaly detection component is the enhancement 
in the heuristic detection rate due to the consideration of 
different environments. Nonetheless, the suggested structure 
(Fig. 1) is proportional to the number of hosts in the network 
because the anomalous component combines host and network 
anomaly-based detection, which might increase the cost of 
deploying CONDOR, even though the false positive rate may 
decrease due to the mathematical techniques suggested by Li et 
al. [6]. 
VI. CONSTRAINTS IN OUR PROPOSAL 
CONDOR enhances the detection of system penetration via 
system calls, but it cannot stop or detect polymorphic worm 
propagation due to the mutant nature of this kind of malware 
[25]. Since some worms use heap overflows and dynamic 
allocation to gain system control [26] [27], it would be required 
to train the CONDOR’s anomaly-based component under 
worm propagation conditions to assess whether the behavioural 
model could be able of detecting this kind of intrusion. 
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